

Causes and consequences of demographic processes and changes in contemporary society

Abstract

For the functioning and development of society the great significance have demographic processes and changes (natural population growth, fertility, birth rate, mortality rate, aging of population, changes in regard to marriage, the frequency of celibacy, divorce). This paper analyzes the causes and consequences of these processes and changes in contemporary society. The trends of demographic changes are not the same in all societies in the world. In developed societies today can be observed, with minor differences, the same demographic trends - low and/or negative natural population growth, the rapid aging of population, low mortality rates, increasing of the divorces and the like. On the other hand, in underdeveloped societies are born many children, where weak economic conditions are conducive to a deterioration in the material, social and health status of the population (illness and mortality, particularly of women and children). This clearly indicates that demographic processes and changes are not directly influenced by economic and social factors (the level of education, the development of society in general, etc.), but that there are a number of indirect social factors causing it (national, class, political, cultural, religious and other). In response to the unfavorable demographic trends (population size, the age of the population, etc.) and the consequences which population factor creates in many economic and social areas (reduction of the working population, the burden of social security funds, etc.), in the past two decades in the most countries population policy was placed in the area of population fertility - there were introduced the pro-natalist measures in developed countries and measures to discourage procreation in underdeveloped countries.

Keywords: *natural population growth, birth rate, fertility, mortality, aging of population, celibacy, marriage, divorce*

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Introduction

Demographic phenomena and processes are prerequisite (a complex, multidimensional and dynamic) for the functioning and development of human society, and are determined by the causes and laws of development of the population and can be the result of natural and social circumstances and events (wars, natural disasters, etc.). They are not directly influenced by social and economic factors (labor force structure, the effect of the education process, the development of society in general, etc.), but there are a number of mediating factors causing them - affecting the levels of fertility and other demographic phenomena (national, class, legal, political, religious, cultural, psychological, etc.). Combined with economic and social factors, they affect the demographic structure, and through it, the movement of the population.² For this reason, demographic analyzes are necessary because they allow "to skillfully capture the changes in behavior and to closely follow the pulsation of society."³ Social processes in a different way affect the population phenomenon. This can be seen in the differences in the effects that occur not only between the different processes, but the differences in the effects can occur within the same category. The example of this is the demographic transition and the consequences it has in both developed and underdeveloped countries.⁴ With the development of industrialization and urbanization comes to the changes in the reproductive behavior of the population (the abandonment of agricultural production and the rural way of life, the changes in the level of education of the population and the qualifications of the workforce, the employment of women, etc.). Almost at the same time, the developed countries have occurred changes in the amount of fertility and mortality of the population, and have begun with the decline in the mortality rate. In underdeveloped countries the demographic transition has begun with the fall of mortality and the birth rate of the population was moving at the same level,

² Dušan Breznik, *Foreword*, in: Zlata Grebo, *The man, Childbearing and Society: Social conditionality of birth rate and population policy in BiH*, Sarajevo: Publishing company Svjetlost, 1975, p. 6.

³ Martin Segalan, *Sociology of the family*, Belgrade: Clio, 2009, p. 138.

⁴ The concept demographic transition was first used by Warren S. Thompson: "The interpretation of changes in population patterns, under which a stable relationship of fertility and mortality rates is achieved when it is reached a certain level of economic prosperity. According to this idea, in societies before the period of industrialization there was a rough balance between the number of births and number of deaths because the population growth was restricted with the lack of food reserves, the spread of infectious diseases or wars. In modern societies, in the contrast, has been established the balance in population patterns, for economic reasons the family has more birth control." Anthony Giddens, *Sociology*, Belgrade: Faculty of Economics, 2005, p. 703.

that would much later began to slowly decrease, which led to high population growth.⁵

Between economic and demographic development there is a connection - a favorable development of one encourages the development of another, but it does not have to always be the rule. In the past few decades in developed societies it is achieved a great economic development, but in them there is a significant population decline or a stagnation, and it is dominated by an aging population. In underdeveloped countries, in the conditions of weak economic development, there has been a great increase of inhabitants, and hence a large proportion of young people.

The period after the Second World War in Europe was marked by a huge demographic boom, whose companion was the restoration of conjugal, bourgeois family, which has found its place and balance in the new industrial and urban society.⁶ For this there are the certain reasons in the society - in the most European countries in this period is established the social order in which classes are clearly separated, the industry is developed, the welfare state is strong, there are respected the Judeo-Christian religious values and the family "here appeared as a stable value, based on marriage, in which ruled the uncontested authority of the father, the only person in the house with the regular cash income."⁷ After this period have been revealed the important phenomena which indicated the symptoms of new developments in marriage and family - their changes and transformation (the change of the position and the role of women in family and society, reducing the birth rate, reduction in the rate of marriages, increase in divorces, the emergence of different lifestyles and etc.), which at its peak was in the 60s of the twentieth century, when started the new revolutionary stream of family changes (in the center it puts the individual), as well as the stages of other demographic transitions.⁸

⁵ *Demographic processes*, Miroslav Rašević, *Dictionary of Sociology*, prepared by Aljoša Mimica and Marija Bogdanović, Belgrade: Institute for Textbooks, 2007, p. 74.

⁶ Vlado Puljiz, *Family Policy*, in: Vlado Puljiz and others., *Social policy: The history, systems, glossary*, Zagreb: Faculty of Law in Zagreb, 2005, p. 323.

⁷ Martin Segalan, *Sociology of the family*, Belgrade: Clio, 2009, p. 10.

⁸ According to the information provided to us by demographers and their factual knowledge second demographic transition had the following stages:

1. 1955 – 1970. (the acceleration of divorces, the baby boom is reaching its end, the decline in fertility in all ages simultaneously, the so-called "contraceptive revolution", the decline in the years of the first marriage, more and more subsequent entry);
2. 1970 – 1985. (the expansion of premarital cohabitation from Northern Europe, the growth of fertility in cohabitation communities, it is not noticeable the increase in the total fertility rate);
3. from the mid 80s until today (it is reduced the likelihood of the re-marriage, the number of post marital cohabitation increases, the total fertility after the 30th year increases, there is the increase in single-parent families and the feminization of poverty). Anđelka Milić, *Sociology of the family: Criticism and Challenges*, Belgrade: Čigoja stamp, 2001, p. 315 – 316.

Today, in all developed societies perceive the same demographic trends, with the slight differences - the natural birth growth is low (and / or negative) due to an ever greater aging of the population, low birth rate, having children at a later age and the like.

Natural growth – The contradictory global trends

Natural growth in the course of the most of human history was extremely low.⁹ As a result of occasional increasing mortality in the past (wars, epidemics and other disasters), natural growth had a negative connotation in some areas. Until the eighteenth century the population of the planet was not great, but for only two centuries it increased by almost five times.¹⁰

Table 1. *The rapid global population growth*

Time	Annual increase in %	Performances of the double in years
1650 – 1750.	0,29	239
1750 – 1800.	0,44	158
1800 – 1850.	0,51	136
1850 – 1900.	0,64	109
1900 – 1920.	0,59	117
1920 – 1950.	1,09	64
1950 – 1961.	1,85	38

Source: Marko Mladenović, *Introduction to Sociology of the family, general and special part*, Belgrade: Publishing company Rad, 1969, p. 240.

During the last century in the world happened the strong demographic explosion. This is illustrated by the fact that the population has increased from 1.6 billion to 6.1 billion. In the first years of the 21st century this number increased for 200 million. According to the medium projection of demographic trends in the United Nations, in the middle of this century, the population

⁹ Natural growth is a decisive factor in population growth, and it is the difference between the number of live births and deceased persons. It is calculated by the rate of natural population growth - changes in the size of the population in 1,000 inhabitants and is the result of differences in the number of births and deaths in a given year.

¹⁰ In the 18th century the population was 728 million, and at the discretion of the Statistical Office of the United Nations for the year 1961, the total population was 3 billion and 69 million, Marko Mladenović, *Introduction to Sociology of the family, general and special part*, Belgrade: Publishing company Rad, 1969, p. 240.

will grow to 8.9 billion, but they will inhabit the underdeveloped parts of the world. It is believed that in Europe and North America will be much smaller population. "The share of European in the world population during the 20th century was reduced from 25% to 12%, and the decline in Europe's share in the world population will continue in the coming period."¹¹ In the past few decades, Europe is facing extremely serious problems when the demographic trends are in the issue (aging population, migration, mortality and fertility trends, processes in the family, etc.). All of this has significant consequences for the political and social situation in Europe (the increase in the size of the cities, forming different structures of the population, resettlement, different territorial distribution of the population, etc.). European countries in the 2003 recorded a natural decrease in the population of 63 thousand. In the same year to Europe have moved two million people from other non-European countries, and therefore it is recorded an increase in population in this continent of about 1.9 million inhabitants. According to the calculations of experts of the United Nations in the 21st century demographic recession will be the largest in the Russian Federation, in Eastern and Southern Europe, while the north and the west of Europe will have a stable demographic situation.¹²

Despite the global trend of increasing the population in developed countries is constantly decreasing the population. This can be explained by the effect of the generally known factors during the demographic transformation - industrialization, urbanization, changes in the population structure, higher social, professional and spatial mobility of the population, an increase in the educational level of the population and so on. However, as indicated by D. Breznik, it must not be lost from sight the factors associated with the revolutionary changes that have come to the fore especially after the Second World War - changes of woman's position in the family, changes in family relations, changing attitudes towards religion and other institutions, the increasing commitment of spouses to plan family size, to give their children more and broader education and the like.¹³

In developed countries, more recently natural birth growth is low (due to an aging population and falling birth rates), while we have a different situation when it comes to developing countries. In modern conditions, in de-

¹¹ Vlado Puljiz, *Demographic trends in Europe*, Documentation - Journal of Social Policy, age 12, no. 2, 2005, Zagreb, p. 263.

¹² *The Same*, p. 264 -265.

¹³ Dušan Breznik, *Foreword*, in: Zlata Grebo, *The man, Childbearing and Society: Social conditionality of birth rate and population policy in BiH*, Sarajevo: Publishing company Svjetlost, 1975, p. 6.

veloping countries there was a reduction in mortality, by downloading the technological development from developed countries, which contributed to the high birth rate. During the demographic transition in developed countries, it was primarily noted the decrease in mortality, and then the drop in birth rates. The period of high natural increase was short, and the population growth rate rarely exceeded 15%. In many developing countries the value of population growth rate exceeds 30%, because the birth rate is decreasing with greater time lag and more slowly than reducing mortality.¹⁴

In order to explain the causes of demographic trends, it is necessary to pay attention to the movement of the birth rate, fertility and mortality, population aging, the process of formation and dissolution of families.

The decline in the birth rate and fertility

The function that provides birth is influenced by various socio-economic and cultural factors. The birth rate represents an aggregate indicator of the level of childbirth.¹⁵ It is the most important demographic variable - a core component of population growth, growth and age structure. This becomes evident in the most countries in conditions of low or declining mortality. The birth rate of the population can not be viewed in isolation from the other components of population movements (migration, mortality, etc.), as well as changes in demographic structures.

In Europe, in the mid-18th century, with the general decline in death rates, the demographic transition began, and in the mid 19th century and the fall in the number of births (birth rate), this trend continued and in the first half of the 20th century. For example, in Sweden, Austria, Italy, and particularly in the UK in 1925 was 17% of households without children, 25% of families with one child, 20% of families with four or five children, 16% of families did not have people younger than 50 years).¹⁶

¹⁴ *Natural Growth*, G. Matković, *Dictionary of Sociology*, prepared by Aljoša Mimica and Marija Bogdanović, Belgrade: Institute for Textbooks, 2007, p. 445.

¹⁵ In absolute terms, the birth rate is defined as the sum of live births, which is determined by the time and space, the generic birth rate (a relative term) is the ratio between the number of live births and the number of inhabitants in a population in a given time period (usually a calendar year). The effective birth rate indicates the extent to which effective fertility affects the population growth. The term total birth growth is rarely used, and can include all births in a population (live births and stillbirths).

¹⁶ Marko Mladenović, *Introduction to Sociology of the family, general and special part*, Belgrade: Publishing company Rad, 1969, p. 241.

With industrialization in western European countries and the United States has been a decline in the number of born children, but in the sixties there was a rise in the birth rate in this country.¹⁷ In European countries since the mid-60s began to drop the birth rate (except for the Netherlands, which traditionally has a high birth rate). In the mid 70's of the 20th century in southern Europe, there was a decrease in this rate. In the early 90s is increased the differences in demographic trends between northern and southern Europe. To a significant increase in the birth rate comes in France since the end of the 20th century - in the 1994 amounted to 1.65‰, in the 1999 1.77‰, and after the 2000 it reaches 1.9‰. This increase in the number of births was observed in women employed in France, and the birth rate was 1.94‰ in 2005. After the unexpected increase in the number of children per woman in 1990 in Sweden (2.17‰), the birth rate falls and now amounts 1.75‰. With the exception of Ireland (1.98‰), the birth rate in the countries of northern Europe is between 1.6‰ and 1.7‰. In Germany, this index is 1.37‰. Fall of the birthrates in southern Europe is recorded a little later, and the lowest birth rates have Italy and Spain (1.32‰).¹⁸ The general fertility rate for the whole world in the period from 1990 - 1995 is estimated at 24‰. Countries in Central, East and West Africa (46, 45 and 45‰ respectively), South Africa (32‰), North Africa, West Asia and South-Central Asia (30‰) and Central America (29‰) had the highest birth rate, and the countries of North America and European countries had the lowest birth rate (15 to 12‰).¹⁹

The literature often does not differentiate between birth and fertility rates, because both of these terms are used to express the birth rate of the population.²⁰ Fertility of the population is the main factor of many social and eco-

¹⁷ "In this period, it was observed more frequent enter into marriages between boys and girls. In the United States, of the entire population, 90% establishes the family. Particularly widespread are the student marriages. In the US, from the total number of students, 10% of women and 27% of men are married; young men usually marry between 22 and 27 years, and girls between 20 and 22 years." Marko Mladenović, *Introduction to Sociology of the family, general and special part*, Belgrade: Publishing company Rad, 1969, p. 241.

¹⁸ Martin Segalan, *Sociology of the family*, Belgrade: Clio, 2009, p. 244.

¹⁹ *Natality*, M. Rašević *Dictionary of Sociology*, prepared by Aljoša Mimica and Marija Bogdanović, Belgrade: Institute for Textbooks, 2007, p. 349.

²⁰ "This is particularly the case in Anglo-Saxon literature. This practice has significantly been contributed by the analytical value of the general birth rate, which is calculated according to the formula $n = (N / P)1000$, where N is the total number of live-born children born between the January 1st and the December 31st of the observed year, and P is the number of inhabitants in the mid of the observed year. This rate, in addition to being used to determine the influence of the components of giving birth to the level of natural growth and population growth, is used as a measure of birth, although less precise, because it is influenced by the age structure of the population." *Natality*, M. Rašević *Dictionary of Sociology*, prepared by Aljoša Mimica and Marija Bogdanović, Belgrade: Institute for Textbooks, 2007, p. 348 - 349.

nomie processes, as well as demographic changes. It indicates the number of live births compared to the female population in the childbearing age (from 15 to 49 years).²¹ The biological, social and psychological factors cause the fertility rate. While these represent the first possible frame of the reproduction, the social and psychological factors condition the level of fertility - their effect is reflected in the number of births.²²

In the EU countries (15 members) in the fifties and sixties was an increase in the total fertility rate (the average number of births per woman in her fertile period), and already in the seventies and eighties is recorded a visible decline in this rate. In these European countries in the 1965 the total fertility rate was 2.72, in the 1975 was 1.96, in the 1985 was 1.60 and 1.45 in the mid nineties.²³

In the developed countries today fertility of the population is low. But this is not the case only in the developed countries of the Western civilization, but also in Japan, other Asian countries, as well as the populations of Latin America and North Africa. About half of the population in the Third World lives in the countries with the lower fertility than it was a few decades ago (low mortality, socio-economic development, family planning, etc.).

If we look at the situation in the post-socialist countries, in them in the past few decades, has also decreased the total fertility rate (in the 2003 Ukraine

²¹ In the analysis of fertility are used the two approaches - longitudinal and transversal. In the first approach is analyzed the number of children who were given birth by a cohort women during all or part of the reproductive period, and within the second approach is viewed the procreative activity in a calendar year for all women who are in the childbearing period of life. *Fertility*, M. Rašević, *Dictionary of Sociology*, prepared by Aljoša Mimica and Marija Bogdanović, Belgrade: Institute for Textbooks, 2007, p. 145 – 146.

²² According to Marina Blagojević, in the demographics are dominant three directions of dealing with fertility: the first, which is in line with the theory of demographic transition, that focuses on the individual and its decision-making on fertility, and the third which to the fertility problem approaches from the perspective of biology or physiology. The first approach links the various indicators of the global process of modernization (industrialization and urbanization) with the changes in fertility - changes in fertility may lead the way or be delayed in relation to industrialization, which is conditioned with some specific social factors. In this explanation, the family is treated as an entity that represents a mere transmission of the requirements of global society and boils down to the institution under which the individual is subsumed. The second approach, the so-called. micro approach of the explanation of changes or the absence of changes in fertility starts from the individual. How Ryder believes in this concept the environment of the individual is treated as a set of conditions. The third approach to explaining fertility starts from the biological essence of fertility, which is actually constituted from sexual intercourse, conception and birth. Marina Blagojević, *Parenthood and Fertility: Serbia in the nineties*, Belgrade: Institute for Sociological Research of the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, 1997, p. 51 – 55.

²³ Conseil de l'Europe, *Evolution démographique en Europe*, Strasbourg, 2003, p. 70.

had a total fertility rate of 1.17, Czech Republic 1.18, Slovenia and Slovakia 1.20). In these countries is still recorded an appreciable decline in this rate, and it is uncertain when it will stabilize, because in them it does not always exist the condition for the realization of the parental role (unemployment, underdevelopment of measures of social and family policy, etc.). From these data we can see that in all these countries the total fertility rate fell well below the level at which the simple reproduction of the population is performed (2,10). In Europe, the highest fertility rates continue to have Albania (2.62 - 1995) and Turkey (2.43 - 2003).²⁴

Table 2. *The total fertility rate, EU-28, 1960 – 2012. (the number of live births per woman)*

	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2005	2010	2011	2012
EU-28 (*)	·	·	·	·	·	1.51	1.61	1.58	1.58
Belgium (†)	2.54	2.25	1.68	1.62	1.67	1.76	1.86	1.81	1.79
Bulgaria (†)	2.31	2.17	2.05	1.82	1.26	1.32	1.57	1.51	1.50
Czech Republic	2.09	1.92	2.08	1.90	1.15	1.29	1.51	1.43	1.45
Denmark	2.57	1.95	1.55	1.67	1.77	1.80	1.87	1.75	1.73
Germany	·	·	·	·	·	1.38	1.34	1.39	1.38
Estonia	1.98	2.17	2.02	2.05	1.36	1.52	1.72	1.61	1.56
Ireland	3.78	3.85	3.21	2.11	1.89	1.86	2.05	2.03	2.01
Greece	2.23	2.40	2.23	1.40	1.27	1.32	1.51	1.39	1.34
Spain	·	·	2.20	1.36	1.23	1.33	1.37	1.34	1.32
France (†)	2.73	2.47	1.95	1.78	1.89	1.94	2.03	2.01	2.01
Croatia	·	·	·	·	·	1.50	1.55	1.48	1.51
Italy	2.37	2.38	1.64	1.33	1.26	1.34	1.46	1.44	1.43
Cyprus	·	·	·	2.41	1.64	1.48	1.44	1.35	1.39
Latvia	·	·	·	·	1.25	1.39	1.36	1.33	1.44
Lithuania	·	2.40	1.99	2.03	1.39	1.29	1.50	1.55	1.60
Luxembourg (†)	2.29	1.97	1.50	1.60	1.76	1.63	1.63	1.52	1.57
Hungary (†)	2.02	1.98	1.91	1.87	1.32	1.31	1.25	1.26	1.34
Malta	·	·	1.99	2.04	1.70	1.38	1.36	1.45	1.43
Netherlands	3.12	2.57	1.60	1.62	1.72	1.71	1.79	1.76	1.72
Austria	2.69	2.29	1.65	1.46	1.36	1.41	1.44	1.43	1.44
Poland (†)	·	·	·	2.06	1.37	1.24	1.38	1.30	1.30
Portugal	3.16	3.01	2.25	1.56	1.55	1.41	1.39	1.35	1.28
Romania	·	·	2.43	1.83	1.31	1.39	1.54	1.46	1.53
Slovenia	·	·	·	1.46	1.26	1.26	1.57	1.56	1.58
Slovakia	3.04	2.41	2.32	2.09	1.30	1.27	1.43	1.45	1.34
Finland	2.72	1.83	1.63	1.78	1.73	1.80	1.87	1.83	1.80
Sweden	·	1.92	1.68	2.13	1.54	1.77	1.98	1.90	1.91
United Kingdom	·	·	1.90	1.83	1.64	1.76	1.92	1.91	1.92
Iceland	·	2.81	2.48	2.30	2.08	2.05	2.20	2.02	2.04
Liechtenstein	·	·	·	·	1.57	1.49	1.40	1.69	1.51
Norway	·	2.50	1.72	1.93	1.85	1.84	1.95	1.88	1.85
Switzerland (†)	2.44	2.10	1.55	1.58	1.50	1.42	1.52	1.52	1.52
Montenegro (†)	·	·	·	·	·	1.60	1.69	1.65	1.71
FYR of Macedonia	·	·	·	·	1.88	1.46	1.56	1.46	1.51
Serbia (†)	·	·	·	·	1.48	1.45	1.40	1.40	1.45
Turkey	·	·	·	·	·	·	2.04	2.03	2.09

(*) 2010–12: break in series.

(†) 2011: break in series.

(‡) 2010: break in series.

(§) Excluding French overseas departments, up to and including 1990. Breaks in series: 2001, 2005 and 2010–12.

(||) 2012: break in series.

(¶) 2000 and 2011: break in series.

Source: Eurostat (online data code: demo_frate)

Source: European Commission eurostat, Fertility statistics, Total fertility rate, 1960–2012 (live births per woman) YB14.png, 3 June 2014, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/File:Total_fertility_rate,_1960%E2%80%932012_%28live_births_per_woman%29_YB14.png, [14/11/2014]

²⁴ Vlado Puljiz, *Demographic trends in Europe*, Documentation - Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 12, no. 2, Zagreb, 2005, p. 268 – 269.

From the above table it can be clearly seen that in all the European countries shown from the 60s of the 20th century is visible a decline in fertility rates. This rate in the 2012 was the highest in the following countries: Turkey (2,09), Iceland (2,04), Ireland (2,01), France (2,01), United Kingdom (1,92), Sweden (1,91), Norway (1,85), Finland (1,80), Belgium (1,79), Denmark (1,73) and the Netherlands (1,72). So, in the Scandinavian countries, the fertility rate is high, which, however, reveals that the development of society in terms of socio-economic impacts the level of fertility rates (high level of the economic development and quality of life, the possibility of reconciliation of professional and family obligations etc.).

However, we must bear in mind that the socio-economic development of the society does not always have a crucial role to play in terms of the number of births of children. This can be seen in the example of countries in the underdeveloped world, where it is still generated a great number of children, and the poor economic conditions are conducive to deterioration in the material, social and health conditions of family members (illness and mortality, particularly of women and children). Here an important role still have traditional attitudes toward family size - it is desirable to have a large number of children, so the fertility rate is very high. In this way are created the resources of workforce on family farms. Some religions or support the birth of many children or are opposed to birth control.²⁵ In some countries, in order to reduce fertility, are undertaken certain measures. This can be seen in the example of China, whose population is increased more in a year than in some countries is the population in general. Due to the large increase in population during the seventies of the last century there was a need to limit the increase, and also to reduce the size of the family. Thus resulted the appearance of the so-called. one-child policy.²⁶

From previous data we can assume that in the future will continue the worsening of demographic situation - in the low fertility areas can be expected a decline in population and the increase in the share of older individuals, and that in the high fertility areas will come to the increase in the total population.

²⁵ Anthony Giddens, *Sociology*, Belgrade: Faculty of Economics, 2005, p. 622.

²⁶ See more in: Vera Graovac, *China's population policy - The successes and shortcomings*, *geography*. hr, 11/02/2005, <http://www.geografija.hr/clanci/540/kineska-populacijska-politika-uspjesi-i-nedostaci> [10/02/2010.]

The causes of the fall of natality and fertility

Changes in birth and fertility rates can be linked to a number of factors: biological (medical), social, cultural, economic, etc. In 15% of couples there are medical (biological) reasons why they can not have offspring (the organic sterility). Also, since the middle of the last century, the mass employment of women, the achievement of financial independence, education, and expressed aspirations for career achievement, the widespread use of contraceptives, ridding the body of reproduction, family planning, changes in the overall status of women in family and society, have resulted in reducing the number of children to which a woman gives birth, the family structure and the like. Also, the causes of this may be found in changing attitudes with regard to the number of children - lowering reproductive norms. But no less significant are the increasing standards related to raising children - the children today for the parents present a financial burden. In the most developed countries there are no adequate measures of family and social policies that would help parents to alleviate the burden that carries the parenthood, but also to combine the family responsibilities and job requirements.

In the past few decades, it is notable the delay of marriage after achieving certain life aspirations, which moves the boundaries of the age of mothers at birth of first child (it is now ranging between 25 and 29 years).²⁷ Postponing the childbirth to a later age, is reducing the possibility that couples have more children. That is how in the most societies the norm of having children descends from two to only one child, and it is not uncommon for individuals to voluntarily give up having children.

In the demographics the connection between marriages and fertility is of great importance. This can be seen in the example of populations that are not enforcing the birth control and those that do. The age of getting into marriage is a direct variable of fertility in populations that are not enforcing the birth control. In populations where it is implemented the birth control, couples in the first years after marrying are starting and terminating their reproduction.²⁸ Thus, a sudden drop in birth rates in developed countries, lower social norms about family size compared to the previous generations are a clear indication of, among others, and widely accepted birth control. Thanks to the innovations in the field of contraception and its wide use, the beginning of reproduction is not directly related to marriage and the enter into a partnership

²⁷ Vlado Puljiz, *Demographic trends in Europe*, Documentation - Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 12, no. 2, Zagreb, 2005, p. 270.

²⁸ *Marriage*, M. Bobić, *Dictionary of Sociology*, prepared by Aljoša Mimica and Marija Bogdanović, Belgrade: Institute for Textbooks, 2007, p. 368.

union, which affects the total fertility rate. Here is an interesting fact that with time there was an improvement in living conditions which have resulted in the creation of favorable conditions for raising potential female fertility (the threshold of the age of entering the puberty is decreasing, and the mortality rate of women during pregnancy), but, as can be seen from the above data, there was a reduction in fertility rates, that is to its limitation. The reason for this is the limitation of the physiological, the natural abilities of individuals, marital couples and populations to participate in reproduction (fecundity) by using different methods of birth control. "An important phenomenon is that sexuality and reproduction became separated, and that the modern contraception is female. The responsibility for making life are first taking those who give life."²⁹ While in the 60s of the last century control of the marital fertility resulted in a decrease of birthing, in the upcoming decades, this phenomenon is associated with changes in marital structure of the population (the fall of the conclusion of the classic marriage). The natural potential for having children is high, so, theoretically speaking, a potentially fertile woman could give birth to one child a year or 35 children during the reproductive age (15 - 49 years old). But and in those populations which do not use methods which could limit the natural potential, a woman gives birth to usually six or seven children during her reproductive period (5.8 in Lesotho, between 6 and 7 in Nepal, Pakistan, Cameroon, Mauritania and Ghana, in Ivory Coast 7.4, 8.2 in Kenya, 8.5 in Yemen). The theoretical set framework for birth differs from the actual childbirth without limitation, and for it can be found an explanation in biological factors and individual behavior.³⁰

²⁹ Martin Segalan, *Sociology of the Family*, Belgrade: Clio, 2009, p. 244.

³⁰ „A large number of researchers documented the relationship between the woman's age and her ability to give birth. The age model of fecundity means lower or higher individual differences. Frank Lorimer has developed it by emphasizing the heterogeneity of individuals in the acquisition or loss of ability to give birth. In fact, all members of a population who are in the childbearing age are not able to participate in the reproduction of the population during the whole period. The differences that in this respect are formed because the individuals (1) at different ages acquire the procreative capacity; (2) lose it at different times of life, and (3) during the entire period, influenced by the accumulation of factors of biological and social background that weaken the fecundity, can be caused the permanent loss of fertility. A hypothetical model of fecundity of women Lorimer made on the basis of assumptions for each of the three above-mentioned elements, ie. the function of fecundity, and thus obtained the number of women capable of childbearing from 14 to 53 years of age in a population. The number of fertile women by age is obtained by multiplying the values for all three functions. In order to calculate the average procreative capacity by a woman in a hypothetical population, Lorimer has introduced the probability of conception in fertile women, as a fourth essential element. He adopted the hypothesis, which he did not explain, that with a probability of 0.36 each fertile woman, regardless of age, can give birth to a live child per year. In this way, it was found that for his model of fecundity the average procreative capacity per woman is 8.32 child during the reproductive period. ...In the last few decades it has been developed a num-

The decline in fertility can be attributed to the changes in society and the values on which the family life is set, first of all, the change of the role that a child has in the family and the attention that is paid to him by modern society (child-centered family), and it is not about, as some authors interpret, the rejection of the child (not having wishes for the birth of a child), selfishness of the partners, etc.

Problems related to natality, that is the fertility, can not be considered independent of mortality, because these processes form the key elements of the population, and have a pronounced impact on the age structure, as the most important population structure.

The decline in mortality

The negative component of natural population growth is mortality.³¹ Although essentially a biological process, its structure and the level is influenced by numerous factors: demographic (age and sex structure of the population), socio-economic (standard of living, employment, education, housing and nutrition levels, conditions of health care), cultural factors (behavior and habits of the population of the importance for their health).³²

Mortality has a significant impact on population growth, so in the beginning of the development of human society, the mortality rate was very high, and only with the industrial revolution it came to its decline. Due to

ber of models of probability of conception. ...Individual differences in the level of fertility in conditions when giving birth is not controlled in any population are significantly higher than macro-differences among different populations. In the historical as well as in traditional environments in development, more than a quarter of married women has less than three or more than nine children born alive at the end of the reproductive period.“ *Fecundity*, M. Rašević, *Dictionary of Sociology*, prepared by Aljoša Mimica and Marija Bogdanović, Belgrade: Institute for Textbooks, 2007, p. 143.

³¹ General mortality rate is the main indicator of the level of mortality. It represents the ratio between the number of dead persons in a given territory over a certain period of time (usually a calendar year) and the respective total population in the middle of that period. The height of this rate depends on the intensity of dying by age and by the age structure. General mortality rate is higher, as a rule, in a very old population, than at an extremely young population. The specific mortality rate by age (and features of the gender) is used for precise measurement of mortality (ratio of the number of dead persons of certain age per 1,000 people of the same age and sex). The standardized mortality rate was comparable to the mortality level for two or more of the population, and is calculated using the appropriate specific rates by age, thus eliminating the disadvantages of general mortality rate.

³² *Mortality*, B. Radivojević, *Dictionary of Sociology*, prepared by Aljoša Mimica and Marija Bogdanović, Belgrade: Institute for Textbooks, 2007, p. 336.

these factors that affect mortality, the decrease was not observed in all the countries in the world (developed and underdeveloped) at the same time. This process in developed countries began a century before than in underdeveloped countries, but took place much more slowly. Along with the social and economic progress that has been made in these countries, there has been progress of knowledge in the field of medicine and the provision of health care, social welfare and so on. In underdeveloped countries the decline in mortality was not related to these factors, but primarily through the use of health care programs and the establishment of prevention and control of the spread of diseases, especially infectious. The major reduction in mortality in almost all parts of the world in the second half of the last century, was visible in the growth of the population.

Differences in the level of mortality exist with regard to age, gender, profession, education and the like. For this reason it is necessary to test the differential mortality of certain population groups. Mortality of the population has a certain regularity in terms of age and sex of the population. In all the age groups, women generally have lower mortality rates than men. Women have a higher mortality rate compared to the male population in the period of childhood and childbirth. In the 17th century, the founders of "political arithmetic" J. Grant and V. Peti pointed to the regularity in the structure of deaths by age, sex and cause of death. The effect of age of the sex on mortality is apparent in all populations. In terms of shape, mortality by age shows great stability and has a distinctive flow. In the first year of life, mortality is high, after it comes to the rapid decline and it is the lowest between ten and fourteen years of age. The constant increase in mortality was recorded with age, first gradually and then rapidly, the highest is in the oldest years of life. Considering that mortality by age is conditioned, above all, by biological factors, the shape of the curve of mortality by age is the same in all populations. The level of mortality curve is not the same for all populations, because, as we said, is conditioned by the social, economic and other environmental factors.³³

The increase of the old population

If we look at developed countries, we can say that they in the past few decades, have faced with the problem of an aging population, and the continuing increase of the aged population (one of the most dominant demographic processes). The composition of the population by age is among the biological structure of the population. Under an aging population implies an increase

³³ *The same.*

in the share of the elderly population (aged 60 and 65 years old) in the total population.³⁴ An old population is the one in which is recorded more than 7% of the population older than 65 years of age. In Europe over the past five decades, the population above 65 years of age increased from 46 million to 112 million, and their share in the total population increased from 8% to 14%.³⁵

The biological structure of the population - the structure of the population by age, are in interdependence with the population movement components (fertility, mortality, migration), as well as the biological, intellectual, socio-economic structures and the like. Reductions in fertility, mortality and migration are the most important demographic characteristics that cause aging of the population. The decline in fertility causes reduction in the proportion of young people and increasing the proportion of elderly. If a longer period of time, is kept a low fertility rate, the age structure is increasingly formed under the influence of trends in mortality. Because of the decline in fertility, since the eighteenth century in the developed countries of Western Europe began the process of the aging of the population. In addition to low fertility, the aging of the population, in modern society, especially from the 60s of the last century, has a lower mortality especially in older groups. The life span of people is significantly extended, and is a result of improving the conditions in which people live, as well as the progress made in medicine. Underdeveloped countries, on the other hand, are facing a very high population growth and the large share of young population.


If we look at the share of elderly population in some countries in the world at the beginning of the XXI century, we can see that in developed countries, mainly the percentage of the population far exceeds those 7 percent. Thus, in the United States it is 12.4%, Japan 17.6%, Sweden 17.2%, Norway 14.8%, but in some less developed countries, such as, for example, in Poland is 12.5% and Czech Republic 13.7%. However, in the underdeveloped part of the world there was a significantly lower proportion of elderly population in the total population compared to the previous countries - for example, in Pakistan 3.5%, Mexico 5.0%, Brazil 5.9%. When comparing continents, Europe has the

³⁴ In addition to these, there are other definitions and classification of the population aging by age group. Another definition of aging puts in a relationship nursing and working contingent (15 - 64 years old). Age structure is one of the most important structures of the population, because it has a large impact on the social and economic development of the population - aging influences the decrease or increase in the population of working (active) age. Of course, some definitions in determining the aging process take into view the number of elderly population in relation to the contingent of the young people. Thus is determined the aging index.

³⁵ "According to the medium projections of the United Nations for 2050 in southern European countries, the share of people older than 65 years will reach 35% of the total population, while in other parts of Europe it will be 28-29%." Vlado Puljiz, *Demographic trends in Europe*, Documentation - Journal of Social Policy, year 12, No. 2, Zagreb, 2005, p. 265.

most elderly population (14.7%), and Africa the least (3.3%). In the middle of the last century, the old population of the world was 5.2% and at the end of it, it was 6.9%.³⁶ If in the current demographic trends do not occur major changes, the average age will continue to increase. P. Peterson called the process of population aging as a grey dawn and predicts, based on current demographic trends, that by the 2030 the share of the people over 65 years of age in the population will amount to 33% in Australia and 50% in Germany. He also notes that the number of people older than 85 years of age increased faster than the number of those aged over 65 years, and that by mid of this century the number of elderly will increase six times compared to their number in the beginning of the century. This process is sometimes referred to as the aging of the elderly.³⁷ The following charts give the basic structure of the population by the age groups in the European Union (EU-28):

Figure 1. Structure of the population according to the basic age groups in the EU-28, 2013-80 (1) (% of total population)



Source: European Commission eurostat, Population structure and ageing, Population structure by major age groups, EU-28, 2013-80 (1) (% of total population) YB14.png, 6 June 2014, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/File:Population_structure_by_major_age_groups,_EU-28,_2013%E2%80%932080_%281%29_%28%25_of_total_population%29_YB14.png [01/11/2014.]

³⁶ Vera Graovac, *The aging of the population - the problem of the modern developed society*, geografija, hr, 14/10/2003, <http://www.geografija.hr/clanci/61/starenje-stanovnistva-problem-modernog-razvijenog-društva> [10/02/2010.]

³⁷ Peter G. Peterson, *Gray Dawn: How the Coming Age Wave will Transform America - and the World*, New York: Random House, 1999.

Migration, at the global level, does not directly affect the formation of the age structure of the population. Because, in the areas in which it was recorded the extreme immigration or emigration, the composition of the population by age is strongly determined by the migration due to the particular selectivity of migrants by age.

In addition to the fact that aging can be seen from a physiological (medical) aspect, it can be seen in the socio-cultural context. The status of old people is different in modern and the pre-modern societies, as well as the contemporary non-Western societies. While in the last one older people have certain privileges and preferred status, in the modern societies they have a lower status and are excluded from all important social activities, ie. they have no power. When it comes to attitude towards the aging by the people themselves, it has recently changed significantly. "The progress of medicine and nutrition demonstrates that all that was once unavoidable, when aging is concerned, can now be prevented or delayed. People on average live longer than a century ago, as a result of improved nutrition, hygiene and health care."³⁸

In terms of the length of the life span and the way people perceive aging, can be observed gender differences. So far it is reported that women live longer than men, so the aging can be referred to as the birthplace of the phenomenon, but also as a consequence of the existence of specific gender disparities in aging between men and women. Since women are, as a rule, more engaged in the performance of their obligations in relation to household and raising children, they are less able to engage in the performance of work or income, and if included, are earning less. It is in later life reflected in their financial status. Women; otherwise, earn less than men and are less in the possession of material goods (house, car, etc.), and disability for women in old age is more present than for men. However, regardless of whether they are women or men, it is clear that when they are older, they are in a materially less favorable position than the rest of the population. Retirement is a substantial part of the revenue decline, which is reflected in the standard of these people, it intensifies in them the feeling of disorientation, loss of status, loneliness and the like.³⁹ However, here are also observed the changes. Once the retirement was perceived as a social death, but this is not the case today. "When they reached the retirement age, the elderly of the 20th century were imbued by the values of effort and work. Pensioners from the beginning of the third millennium are the same ones who went through all the social and economic changes, participated in the sexual liberation, they supported the rise of individualism. These old people and in this stage of life are looking for

³⁸ Anthony Giddens, *Sociology*, Belgrade: Faculty of Economics, 2005, pp. 176.

³⁹ *The Same*, pp. 178 – 179.

independence and personal development.”⁴⁰ However, it is not uncommon for old people to face discrimination merely because of their age.⁴¹

Reducing the number of children or not having children at all, can affect the quality of life of the individual in the old age, but also the increased pressure on the social protection system (security), pension funds and the like. Of course, in the pre-modern period when there was no extrafamilial, institutional protection of individuals (financial, health, etc.), a large number of children meant for parents in old age, among other things, that kind of security. In modern times, people have begun to carry out income-based work, which included in addition to remuneration, the separation of certain funds for various forms of social protection and the realization of the right to a cash payment upon the termination of employment (pensions), which means owning resources to maintain a certain level, lifestyle. This weakens the importance of the family in the terms of providing the material assistance to their elderly members, while family members are relieved of this pressure. However, the family does not lose its importance either for the individual or for society - from the number of births, or increasing a young, working population depends the maintaining the system of social protection and pension systems, as well as their quality. Therefore, it is essential that at the working age are present younger generations who pay contributions for pensions and other social insurance, and to a greater number than the number of users of these rights. In modern societies, is emphasized the aging of population as a demographic crisis of the pension and other social security systems. The aging of population is due, on the one hand, the extend of the average duration of the human life (aging from the top), and the declining of the birth, declining of the fertility rates (aging from the bottom). By reducing the number of working age people is deteriorating relationship between the working population and retirees, which is reflected in the so-called. the index of dependency (the dependency ratio), which is disadvantageous or has a tendency of deterioration in the most European countries. The increase in the elderly population, especially over 80 years in developed countries, is reflected in the increase in the cost of social benefits and social services for these people, providing health care, and the pressure on the pension system. In many Western European countries (in the EU in 2000, the costs for pensions amounted to 10.4% of GDP)⁴², as well as the post-socialist countries

⁴⁰ Martin Segalan, *Sociology of the family*, Belgrade: Clio, 2009, pp. 270 – 271.

⁴¹ Discrimination against people based on their age is called the Age-ism. Today in the world there are a lot groups that fight against this kind of discrimination in order to promote a positive attitude towards the elderly.

⁴² B. Palier, *La réforme des retraites*, Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 23. in: Gojko Bežovan and others., *Systems of social policy*, in: Vlado Puljiz and others, *Social policy: the history, systems, glossary*,

(World Bank experts predict in the 2050 pension expenses 14.2% of GDP)⁴³ significantly increased public pension costs. Pension crisis deepened and the increased unemployment, changes in the structure of the work, the processes of globalization, the liberalization of world markets and the like.⁴⁴ Considering that after the 2010 started to move into retirement generations born in the 50s of the 20th century (“baby boomers”), is predicted the deepening crisis of the pension system (a large number of these pensioners compared to the current generation of the few employees). Therefore, in this case, we can assume the need for greater family solidarity and support (various forms of tangible and intangible aid).

However, aging can not be accessed only in a negative context (illness, poverty, powerlessness, etc.), but also in the positive - this is the age at which people can start many activities, but also be released of many parental and professional obligations.

Changes related to marriage

In all European countries in previous decades is shown a decrease in the number of marriages (gross rate of marriages).⁴⁵ This rate has, for example, in France from the year 1960 to 2000 fell from 7.0% to 5.1%. In Germany during the same period, the rate of marriages has dropped from 9.5% to 5.1%, Italy 7.7% to 4.9%. And other European countries have reported similar trends. Post-socialist countries that emerged after the breakup of the Soviet Union, except for countries with an Islamic majority, now have the lowest rate of marriages.⁴⁶ The changes are present in terms of the age of partners at their first marriage. The decline in the percentage of marriages in the age group below thirty years was visible first in Sweden and Denmark. This trend is spreading in the early 70-ies of the XX century and to the other countries: the USA, Britain, West Germany and France. In the period between 1981 to 1990, the rate of marriages in all age groups is decreasing in the UK from 7.1% a year per thousand people to 6.8%, and in 1995 to less than 6.⁴⁷ The rate

Zagreb: Faculty of Law in Zagreb, 2005, p. 185.

⁴³ The World Bank, *The Evolution of Pension Systems in Eastern Europe and Central Asia*, Washington D.C., 2000, p. 9.

⁴⁴ Gojko Bežovan and others, *Systems of social policy*, in: Vlado Puljiz and others, *Social policy: the history, systems, glossary*, Zagreb: Faculty of Law in Zagreb, 2005, p. 186 – 187.

⁴⁵ Gross Marriage rate - the number of marriages per 1,000 inhabitants.

⁴⁶ Vlado Puljiz, *Family policy*, in: Vlado Puljiz and others, *Social policy: the history, systems, glossary*, Zagreb: Faculty of Law in Zagreb, 2005, p. 324.

⁴⁷ Source: *Social Trends*, London: HMSO, 1998.

of first marriage for women to fifty years of age in the 1960 in Europe stood at around 0.95, meaning that 95% of women under the age of 50 for the first time entered into a marriage. However, four decades later, less than two thirds of women first got married to 50 years of age (in the year 2002 the rate for the whole Europe was 0.62).⁴⁸ Disposal of marriage is under the influence of the aging marital contingent, that is the decrease of new entering generations and disposal of marriage to a later age. Changing the position and the role of women in society and in the family, changes in the marital dyad, as well as the changes in its content and meaning which it has for the actors, introduced changes in the traditional institution of marriage.⁴⁹ In modern society, one of the causes of marriage later in life is and the change of the treatment of the traditional institution of marriage. It is the average age at marriage that is a significant indicator of marital transition model. If the rate of marriages of older cohorts compensates for the behavior of young people, moving the age for getting into marriage, does not necessarily mean resistance to marriage.⁵⁰ However, the postponement of marriage to a later age may be the result of consciousness "that the life expectancy is extended, that is, for those decisions in life there is time and later."⁵¹ However, this reduces the deposition of the biological potential of partners for obtaining seed, which has resulted in the birth of a small number of children. On the other hand, marriage is no longer a necessary framework for reproduction, and marriage does not necessarily have to be associated with reproduction, ie. partners can have children before marriage or do not want to have children so the marriages and fertility do not need to be brought into close connection.

⁴⁸ "The lowest rate of marriages of women under 50 years were recorded in Georgia (0.28), Slovenia (0.43) and Hungary (0.47), and the largest in Turkey (0.85), Romania (0.69) and Denmark (0.69)." Vlado Puljiz, *Demographic trends in Europe*, Documentation - Journal of Social Policy, Vol. 12, no. 2, Zagreb, 2005, str. 267.

⁴⁹ See more in: Mirjana Bobić, *Marriage and/or partnerships, demographic and sociological studies*, Belgrade: Čigoja stamp, 2003.; Mirjana Bobić, "The transformation of marriage - a strategy of preservation and disposal of changes" in: Anđelka Milić and others, *Social transformation and strategies of social groups. Lifestyle of Serbia at the beginning of the third millennium*, Belgrade: ISI FF, 2004.

⁵⁰ *Marriage*, M. Bobić, *Dictionary of Sociology*, prepared by Aljoša Mimica and Marija Bogdanović, Belgrade: Institute for Textbooks, 2007, p. 369.

⁵¹ Mirjana Bobić, *Demography and Sociology - connection or synthesis*, Belgrade: JP Official Gazette, 2007, p. 180.

The frequency of celibacy

Also, in modern society we can see an increase in the number of those who are permanently opting for celibacy, that is, to live alone, and those who do not want to have children. In all populations, the frequency of celibacy by generations has the same basic shape, and this is its negative correlation with age - it is high among younger generations, while in the old age is very low, and to its reduction comes at an age when people usually opt for marriage - it is more common in men up to thirty years of age than in women, due to their subsequent getting into marriage. With the emergence of new styles of partnership these differences in the behavior of the poles are reduced, which results in changes in the content of marriage, specific marital structures (widowed, divorced) and celibacy. The recent emergence of permanent withdrawal from the partnership (committed singles) is increasing, and some of the authors "fear that the current globalization of the economy would not only increase voluntary withdrawal from birth ('sociological sterility', childlessness) due to the tendency of decreasing state support for families and children but also the polarization to the two population groups within the family and the outside-family households."⁵² The term completion of celibacy implies the habitants in the age of 50 who have not entered in the first marriage. Due to the direct connection of variables of marriage and birth, a significant proportion of the female population is in the completion of a celibate. In modern industrialized societies, there is a gender asymmetry, so it is more likely that some women remain in the celibate and outside the reproduction. Also, with changes in the status and role of women in society, the possibility of extending the voluntary celibacy and in the later years of the reproductive cycle is open. Education, employment, career, contraception, individual life goals, aspirations, and (class conditional) system of values, the decline of state support for families, increase the likelihood of not only biological but also the willing infertility (sociological sterility).⁵³ It is the share of completed celibacy that is a clear indication of falling popularity of marriage as an institution.

Divorce in contemporary society

The institution of divorce is a universal social fact and as old as marriage itself. Divorce is a process for legitimate and legal annulment of marriage (disassembly or separation) of a spouse, who for some reason can not or do

⁵² *The Same.*

⁵³ *Celibacyt*, M. Bobić, *Dictionary of Sociology*, prepared by Aljoša Mimica and Marija Bogdanović, Belgrade: Institute for Textbooks, 2007, p. 55.

not want to live together.⁵⁴ There are also cases of (illegal) dissemination of wedlock which derive from leaving families and partners by a spouse whose new place of residence is unknown.⁵⁵

In all the countries in the world since the middle of the last century, the rate of divorces (divorce rates) are constantly increasing.⁵⁶ One of the most significant trends that are reflected in family patterns in most industrialized societies is to increase these rates (in the mid sixties around 10% and the eighties 30%). In some European countries today is divorcing almost every second marriage (for example, the divorce rate in 2000 was 0.55 in Sweden, 0.51 in Finland, Denmark 0.45, 0.43 in the Czech Republic and Austria 0.43).⁵⁷

Along with a reduction in the rate of marriage in the most European countries, there is an increase in the number of divorces compared to the number of marriages, which can be seen from the following graph:


⁵⁴ The collapse of marriage can be divided into three main categories:

1. divorce, which means the legal end of marriage,
2. separation, which means the physical separation of spouses; they no longer have the common habitat,
3. the so-called 'empty' marriages in which the spouses live together, remain before the law married, but the marriage exists only on paper. Michael Haralambos and Martin Holborn, *Sociology - Themes and perspective, Part I*, Zagreb: Golden marketing, 2002, p. 566.

⁵⁵ Especially for men from minority groups in America (Blacks, Mexicans and others.) this is a characteristic pattern of behavior, because they do not have the financial resources to take care of their family members when they cease to live with them, and large geographic distances allow them to disappear without trace. Anelka Milić, *Sociology of the family - critics and challenges*, Belgrade: Čigoja stamp, 2001, p. 121.

⁵⁶ To be able to monitor the incidence of divorce, as well as other characteristics that are related to divorce, are founded demographic measures - the divorce rate (the rate of divorce - lat. Divortium - divorce, breakup, goodbye), which expresses the number of divorces per 1,000 inhabitants in the married ages or in the appropriate number of marriages. ...The general divorce rate represents the ratio of divorces per 1 000 inhabitant during the year: $d = D/P \times 1.000$ (D = the number of divorces, P = the number of a mid-year population). There are also specific divorce rates, which measure the frequency of divorce with regard to some of the characteristics of the population that is divorced (the spouse age, years of marriage, permanence of marriage), as well as the total divorce rate, which represents the ratio between the number of divorces per 1,000 marriages. *Divorce*, M. Ljubičić, *Dictionary of Sociology*, Belgrade: Institute for Textbooks, 2007, p. 86.

⁵⁷ Source: Conseil de l'Europe, *Evolution démographique en Europe, Strasbourg*, 2003, p. 62. in: Vlado Puljiz, *Family Policy*, in: Vlado Puljiz and others, *Social policy: the history, systems, glossary*, Zagreb: Faculty of Law in Zagreb, 2005, p. 324.

Chart 2. Rates of marriages and divorce rates, EU-28, 1970 - 2010 (per 1,000 inhabitants)

(¹) 2008 instead of 2010.

Source: Eurostat (online data codes: demo_nind and demo_ndivind)

Source: European Commission eurostat, Marriage and divorce statistics, Crude marriage and divorce rates, EU-28, 1970–2010 (per 1 000 inhabitants) YB14.png, 18 June 2014, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/File:Crude_marriage_and_divorce_rates,_EU-28,_1970%E2%80%932010_%28per_1_000_inhabitants%29_YB14.png, [14/11/2014.]

Changes in marriage and divorce in the same time periods were not equally among all European countries. So today divorce in the individual countries of Europe occurs in varying degrees, in the south is relatively low and includes between 10 and 20% of marriages, while in the north is between 40 and 45% of marriages.⁵⁸ This phenomenon some authors explain with the different religious traditions in certain countries, then a variety of economic and social development, which some societies reached after World War II, but also due to the fact that women have become more independent, especially in the economic terms.

From the statistical data on divorce rates we can not get a real picture of the true state of things, because, as noted by A. Giddens, “divorce rates do not include those people who are separated but not legally divorced. Moreover, people who are unhappy in marriage can remain together - because they believe in the sanctity of marriage, or are unable to cope with the financial and emotional consequences of the break or else stay together for the kids.”⁵⁹ The frequency of divorce this theorist explains with the factors that are related to

⁵⁸ Martin Segalan, *Sociology of the Family*, Belgrade: Clio, 2009, p. 187.

⁵⁹ Anthony Giddens, *Sociology*, Belgrade: Faculty of Economics, 2005, p. 193.

broader social changes (economic independence of women, greater overall wealth of society, changing attitudes to divorce, etc.). As an important factor in the incidence of divorce is “increasingly evident tendency to estimate marriage through the level of personal satisfaction it provides. It appears that the increasing divorce rates are not an indication of the deep discontent with marriage as such, but the increasing determination to make it a much richer relationship.”⁶⁰ This would mean that the higher divorce rate indicates a greater value that is attributed to marriage, growing expectations from marriage than before, which may be justified with an increase in re-marriages.

Some theorists seek the causes of marital breakdown in the specialization of the family in a small number of functions that took place in the industrial society, which has resulted in the weakening of the sense of community and intimate relationships between family members, especially spouses.

Divorce in the contemporary society is present in all marital groups, regardless of the age of the spouse and the time they spent in a marriage.⁶¹ The age of spouses in divorce proceedings is not negligible. It has demographic implications various of the male and female population, which largely depends on the socio-cultural model that determines the re-marriage and the resume of reproduction.

Population policy - a response to adverse demographic trends (Objectives, Measures and Effects)

Since men have always met with population problems, population policy elements can be found and in an early human communities.⁶² But only since the modern era, there is a continuity in policy implementation, as well as the most important and generally accepted principles, institutions and objectives of population policy. The intensification of political activities in connection with the population characterized the previous century (mortality policy, improving health, migration policy, policies in the area of fertility, etc.). In some societies, there have been attempts of state to directly shape the family

⁶⁰ *The Same*, p. 194.

⁶¹ According to the information given by Mirjana Bobić, earlier marriages were divorced more in the younger age of spouses (characteristic crisis years were after three and a half or seven years of marriage). *Divorce*, M. Bobić, *Dictionary of Sociology*, prepared by Aljoša Mimica and Marija Bogdanović, Belgrade: Institute for Textbooks, 2007, p. 481.

⁶² “Population policy, as a conscious, deliberate, mainly explicit government intervention in demographic trends...” Marina Blagojević, *Parenting and fertility - Serbia in the nineties*, Belgrade: Institute for Sociological Research of the Faculty of Philosophy in Belgrade, 1997, p. 26.

life, where family policy was marked by population objectives (in the former USSR, Romania, China and France).⁶³ In China the situation is different - individuals have to seek permission to have more than one child, there are certain measures and sanctions in order for all to be engaged in reducing the birth rate. In the UK families were treated with the area of privacy, and it was considered inappropriate for the government to take any measures which would mean the interference in this private sphere.⁶⁴

The consequences that population factor creates in many economic and social areas, in the past two decades, have made the population policy in the field of population fertility as an important precondition for development in the broadest sense. In response to the unfavorable demographic trends (population size, age structure, etc.), have been introduced the pronatalist measures in developed countries and measures to discourage having children in underdeveloped countries. In the most modern societies there is an indirect approach through the many social policies (employment, housing, etc.), and in particular through policies to support the family, trying to create the conditions that might be conducive to having children. This approach is practiced for the reasons of resistance to direct political interference in the reproductive behavior of individuals.

The effects of population policy measures do not have in most cases the desired results. Thus arises the question of adequacy of measures of population policy, and the issue of (not) adequate operationalization of these measures (the maximum effect of the measures applied is the increase in completed fertility up to 10%, which is in conditions of extremely low fertility insufficient.).⁶⁵

⁶³ The communist government in the Soviet Union in the 20s of the last century took measures whose aim was to weaken and destroy the family, so it has adopted measures which greatly facilitated the procedure of divorce and abortions. During the communist regime in Romania by N. Čauševskog, people were encouraged to start a family, so for the individuals who by the age of 25 were not married was imposed to pay the excise tax, which is aimed at increasing the birth rate. Here one can mention the example of France in the first half of the 20th century. As the part of Malthusian demographic framework in the service of national and military objectives between the two wars, family policy was aimed at encouraging the birth of more children. It was promoted by the movement for the procreation of children and the family - they highlighted the moral sense of the family and fought for the family to receive help. It is in this context, in 1920, established the national holiday of mothers with several children, for whose organization is in charge the National Association for the dissemination of the French population, led by Bertillon. Martin Segalan, *Sociology of the family*, Belgrade: Clio, 2009, p. 31.

⁶⁴ A. Wilson, *Family*, London: Tavistock, 1985, in: Michael Haralambos and Martin Holborn, *Sociology - Themes and Perspectives*, Part I, Zagreb: Golden marketing, 2002, p. 572.

⁶⁵ *Population Policy*, M. Rašević, *Dictionary of Sociology*, Belgrade: Institute for Textbooks, 2007, p. 410.

Looking at demographic trends in the developed and in the underdeveloped parts of the world, it is obvious that, if they continue in the same direction, it will leave negative effects on social and economic development from local to global levels. Therefore, the developed and undeveloped parts of the world must be seriously engaged in the development and implementation of the appropriate population policy.⁶⁶

The diseases that are lifestyle-related, degenerative diseases, environmental protection, health promotion and the like. in developed countries are at the center of the attention of mortality policies. Another important area of activity within the population policy becomes the international migration, as in many developed countries comes to an influx of population due to immigration from other countries, which goes beyond their capacities and needs. Thus, in these countries are taken a series of measures to reduce the influx of immigrants. In recent years, developing countries have adopted population policy as part of their development plans. Reduced population growth as the primary goal of population policy adopted and governments which through the long history were advocating for the pro-birth policy. Today explicit population policy is implemented by 62% of the countries of Asia and the Pacific, 58% of African countries, and about 40% of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. Bearing in mind the consequences and demographic inertia, a large number of countries have started too late to intervene. The central components of population policies pursued by developing countries are maternal and child health, family planning, public health, status of women, information and education of the population. Within these policies fully informative differences are not significant and consist of inclusion or non-inclusion of less important topics such as migration, urbanization, rural development, social welfare, environmental protection and inclusion of young or old population as a specific target group.⁶⁷ However, it must be borne in mind that developing countries face many problems and difficulties in securing funding for the realization of the program of population policy.

⁶⁶ This means that in the underdeveloped world, where there have been a natural growth, must be taken measures to reduce the birth rate, equalizing the age structure and improving the living conditions. On the other hand, the developed world had to work on population policy measures which would encourage people during the reproductive period to have children at all, or the birth of a large number of children, in order to prevent the process of population aging and low, in some countries negative rate of the natural population growth.

⁶⁷ *Population Policy*, M. Rašević, *Dictionary of Sociology*, Belgrade: Institute for Textbooks, 2007, p. 410 – 411.

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